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From ‘former comrades’ to ‘near enemy’: The narrative template of ‘armed struggle’ 
and conflicting discourses on Violent Dissident Irish Republican activity (VDR). 
Abstract 
Introduction 
Although academic literature identifies different temporal ‘waves’ of political violence, in the 
Irish context it has been an enduring presence. Driven by a desire for self-determination and 
an end to ‘British rule’, this has been articulated through insurrectionary violence otherwise 
termed ‘armed struggle’ by its supporters and ‘terrorism’ by its opponents. ‘Armed struggle’ 
is the most identifiable signifier of Irish republicanism having featured since time 
immemorial although commitment to it has never been absolute. Successive leaderships have 
compromised, discarded it and embraced constitutional politics. As much as it is historically 
defined by ‘armed struggle’ Irish republicanism has too been defined by internal splits and 
the marginalisation of ‘former comrades’ (Tonge 2004). Writing on nationalistic Russian 
narratives, JV Wertsch (2002) refers to a ‘narrative template’; an account of the collective 
past where the general plot remains constant even though specific actors and dates change. In 
the Russian case an “expulsion of foreign enemies” narrative template is illustrative; historic 
cases of war are mapped onto a narrative plot of Russians being attacked by external forces 
and triumphing through heroism in the face of almost certain defeat. The foreign enemy has, 
depending on the era, varied from the Nazis to the Ottomans while the leader inspiring 
heroism has similarly varied but the plot line has always remained constant (Wertsch 2009). 
Narrative templates reduce the collective past to “the same story told over and over with 
different characters” (Wertsch 2012). Given the propensity of Irish republicanism to split 
over ‘armed struggle’ and the marginalisation of ‘former comrades’ this causes, it is the aim 
of this article to critically evaluate how current discourses on what has been termed ‘violent 
dissident republican’ activity (VDR) can be mapped onto narrative templates of ‘armed 
struggle’.  
In applying Wertsch’s narrative template concept to discourses on VDR several caveats must 
be acknowledged. Primarily it should be noted that the “Balkanization of republicanism” 
means current division is not a simple binary of those in favour of the Good Friday 
Agreement (GFA) and those against it (Frenett and Smith 2012). The anti-GFA constituency 
contains different groups that are opposed to Sinn Fein but also competing with each other 
over finer points of ideology, resources, recruits and publicity. A curious dynamic exists 
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whereby competing groups assert the need for their own existence by somehow 
differentiating themselves from the others. As Frampton (2011) has observed, this can see 
undue weight given to arcane disagreements over obscure points of ideological dogma. While 
he has insightfully drawn out these internal anti-GFA cleavages, it is not the purpose of this 
article to retrace that well-trodden ground. Rather than examining how each VDR group 
justifies its own ideological birth right and being with regard to similar groups, this article 
concentrates on how they use the past to condition their discourse on continued ‘armed 
struggle’ in the face of criticism from ‘former comrades’. Secondly opposition to the GFA 
does not equate endorsement of current ‘armed struggle’. As Guelke (2006) points out, the 
reasons for rejecting a peace accord are manifold and varied and can often be legitimate. 
Some in the anti-GFA constituency do advocate VDR, others adopt a position of “non-
support but not condemnation” while others disagree with it as much as they disagree with 
Sinn Fein (Evans and Tonge 2012). These caveats do not, however, render the narrative 
template concept obsolete. Competing discourses on VDR are framed by well worn clichés 
and counter-clichés applied to present contexts. They are, depending on the narrator, framed 
by the rhetoric of war, rejection of “sell out” and continuing the “fight for Irish freedom” or 
conversely by historic arguments on lack of support and political utility (Bowman-Grieve and 
Conway 2012). A narrative template framework enables current discourses on VDR to be 
interrogated through reversion to pre-existing scripts. The salience of such a framework is its 
ability to use interpretations rooted in the “collective DNA” to make sense of current contexts 
by placing them in a schematic plot line (Wertsch 2012: 176). ‘Armed struggle’, splitting and 
enmity towards ‘former comrades’ are unquestionable strands of the Irish republican 
“collective DNA” (Morrison 2013), thus they provide an insight into internal ‘memory 
politics’ within the constituency. ‘Memory politics’ can be defined as the medium through 
which the past is selectively ‘remembered’ or ‘forgotten’ to construct, maintain or challenge 
dominant discourses for political benefit. Narrative templates, in being adaptable for self-
legitimation in internal ‘memory politics’, are susceptible to selective ‘remembering’ and 
‘forgetting’.  
This article uses the narrative template concept to critically evaluate how conflicting 
discourses on VDR are constructed through recourse to past scripts that reinforce one’s 
present position while simultaneously attacking that of ‘former comrades’. The thrust of this 
article, however, is not merely to argue that competing groups use the past to legitimate their 
own position and delegitimise that of their rivals - such an endeavour would be neither novel 
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nor innovative. Rather the original contribution this article seeks to make by applying 
memory studies concepts to the empirical study of political violence is to identify what the 
dominant discursive themes drawn upon in discourses of self-legitimation in ‘memory 
politics’ contestation are and why they are drawn upon by two key constituencies; those 
formerly engaged in ‘armed struggle’ but now embracing constitutional means and those who 
continue to advocate or engage in ‘armed struggle’. As such, the article aims to identify the 
inherent value of these dominant narrative themes and why they can still be readily applied to 
present circumstances and discourses on VDR decades after they were initially woven into a 
formative narrative template. The empirical data to which this theoretical analysis has been 
applied has been drawn from Irish republican publications such as An Phoblacht (Provisional 
movement), Saoirse (Republican Sinn Fein), The Sovereign Nation (32 County Sovereignty 
Movement) and United Irishman (Official movement). It has drawn from semi-structured 
interviews conducted by the author with 30 actors within the wider Irish republican 
constituency.1 Interviewees included pre and post-GFA former political prisoners, political 
activists and community activists from right across the broad Irish republican spectrum. 
Interviewees were drawn from a number of geographical locations and included both 
genders. All indications of name, location and gender have, however, been removed - a 
random number has instead been assigned to interviewees.  
Contextualising recent splits 
Before examining how current discourses on VDR correlate with narrative templates on 
‘armed struggle’ it is necessary to summarise the trajectory of successive splits within Irish 
republicanism. Although not exhaustive, this account provides sufficient historical context to 
understand recent splits. Irish republicanism is traced back to Theobald Wolfe Tone and the 
United Irishmen society who used ‘armed struggle’ in 1798 to “break the connection with 
England” (English 2006). Physical force became integral to Irish republican ideology, 
passing on to the Young Ireland movement and Fenians before extending into the 20th 
century with longevity that Hobsbawm (1962: 112) notes was rare elsewhere. Following the 
1916 Rising ‘armed struggle’ became the definitive tenet of the ideology, with the subsequent 
Irish War of Independence or ‘Tan War’ seeing the Second Dail Eireann vesting its authority 
in the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as the de facto government in waiting (English 2006). Up 
to this point Irish republicanism had been largely unified (thanks to the unification of the 
nationalist Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) strand led by Padraig Pearse with the socialist 
Irish Citizen Army strand led by James Connolly in 1916), its separatist aims unambiguous 
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and ‘armed struggle’ the unquestionable bedrock upon which self-determination would be 
won. This worldview was unceremoniously shattered when the Tan War waned and 
negotiations with the British resulted not in self-determination – ‘the Republic’ - but in a 
partitionist Free State that excluded six north-eastern Ulster counties. When the IRA split into 
pro and anti-Treaty factions in a vicious civil war this set the precedent for bitter division 
between those clinging to ‘armed struggle’ and those embracing constitutional means.       
This pattern would be endlessly repeated; when Fianna Fail disavowed ‘armed struggle’, and 
entered constitutional politics, when the Officials embraced constitutional means and 
announced a ceasefire in 1972 ( the Officials would later undergo further splits with the 
emergence of the Irish Republican Socialist Movement and its armed wing the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA) in 1974, which then itself later split in 1986 with the emergence of 
the Irish People’s Liberation Organisation (IPLO) – both these groups would factionalise into 
feuding ‘Army Council’ and ‘Belfast Brigade’ factions) and when the Provisionals dropped 
abstentionism (1986), accepted the Mitchell Principles and GFA (1997/8) and endorsed 
policing (2006/7). In each split myriad factors converged on the departure from, downgrading 
of or delegitimising of ‘armed struggle’, making it the issue through which disagreement is 
channelled, interpreted and represented. If, as Sanders (2011:1) argues, current day 
factionalising can only be understood through comparative analysis of a succession of 
splinter groups, some further analysis is warranted. Comparative analysis of the opportunity 
structures that different splinter groups found themselves born into can identify why some 
splinter groups were able to quickly supplant the parent group while others faced a constant 
battle for relevance.  In each case the splinter group, by mere virtue of its emergence from the 
parent group at a key historical juncture, found itself hostage to whatever fortune the space 
created by the interplay between the parent group position and the wider political climate 
afforded it.   
The post-treaty split occurred against a backdrop of military stalemate whereby the IRA were 
far from defeat by but just as far from imminent victory over the British (English 2003:29). 
Although the anti-treaty IRA did have ideological righteousness on its side during the 
ensuing civil war, this was little practical consolation when faced with a pro-treaty side that 
was better organised, better equipped and better supported. They were largely victims of a 
dearth of opportunity; most of Nationalist Ireland had accorded due legitimacy to the Free 
State narrowing its ideologically purist appeal while the Free State, due to this legitimacy and 
its indigenous roots, was able to exercise ruthlessness in reprisals against ‘former comrades’ 
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without incurring the same popular backlash that the British (lacking such legitimacy) had 
previously encountered (English 2003: 35). By the 1930’s the emergence and success of 
Fianna Fail, financial difficulty, organisational problems and disagreement resulting in the 
resignation of its more leftist element left the IRA a pale shadow of its Tan War forbearer. 
Often lurking from one crisis to the next, they remained intact but could not generate a 
concerted campaign until the ill-fated Border Campaign in 1956. By contrast, the splinter 
groups of the 1970’s – the Provisionals and the INLA – benefitted from more favourable 
opportunity structures that granted them a longevity to eventually eclipse their Official IRA 
parent group (Sanders 2011: 86). In addition to the inherent advantage of being born into a 
context of intensifying political violence while the Official IRA parent group was trying to 
enforce movement away from ‘armed struggle’, both capitalised on developments on the 
ground during their formative years. The Provisionals rise to dominance followed their 
defence of the Short Strand in June 1970, their capitalising on the fallout caused by the 
Lower Falls Curfew in July 1970 and their lack of damage in comparison to the Officials 
during internment in August 1971, while the INLA benefited from its ability to attract both 
militant Officials and disaffected Provisionals during their 1975 ceasefire (Sanders 2011).   
In comparison, the Continuity IRA (CIRA), formed following the 1986 split in Sinn Fein 
over abstentionism, were confronted with less favourable opportunity structures. Ironically 
those leading the 1986 defections were those who had originally defected from the Officials 
to form the Provisionals (English 2003: 315). Disquiet did admittedly exist within Provisional 
ranks over the dropping of abstentionism and over the increasing emphasis afforded to 
electoralism by the “Armalite and Ballot box” strategy. However Moloney (2002: 288) notes 
that the Provisional leadership were able to preclude any major split due to an amalgam of 
complex and interrelated factors including; important contextual difference from the Official 
split, electoral gains by Sinn Fein, the role leading dissenters played in brokering the 
disastrous 1975 ceasefire and the physical and metaphorical distance of the dissenters from 
the Northern theatre of war. More importantly, the Provisional leadership were able to use the 
recent landing of Libyan weapons and a much speculated ‘Tet offensive’ to plausibly deny 
any intention to wind down the ‘armed struggle’ in favour of electoralism. As a result, 
militant minded critics held rank meaning that those that did break away were a small 
minority. Moreover, as an extensive history of feuding shows, the CIRA were hamstrung by 
the fact that the still active Provisionals were unlikely to tolerate a splinter group encroaching 
on its territory. This had been underlined some months earlier when a different group of 
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militants were expelled from the Provisionals following a failed coup, with a further warning 
not to organise a new armed group (Moloney 2002: 244). Even though the Republican Sinn 
Fein (RSF) political party established itself as an ideological vanguard in the immediate 
aftermath of the split, its military wing remained largely under the radar. The CIRA only 
moved out of the shadows following the Provisionals ceasefire in 1994 (Sanders 2011: 147). 
The Real IRA (RIRA) came into being out of opposition to the Mitchell Principles and the 
renewal of the Provisional ceasefire in 1997. It was born into a curious climate that seemed 
initially favourable but later proved hostile. Most notably, the RIRA found itself in an 
environment defined by ‘war weariness’ within IRA ranks after decades of ‘armed struggle’ 
coupled with unprecedented electoral success for Sinn Fein in the 1997 Westminster and Dail 
elections – both providing the politically minded Provisional leadership with much needed 
leeway (English 2003). The soon-to-be defectors appeared to have the upper hand 18 months 
before their departure but they failed to capitalise on the opportunity to displace the politicos 
in the Provisional leadership. In the immediate prelude to the 1997 split it looked like the 
politically minded leadership would be toppled and the peace strategy buried by militants on 
the IRA Army Executive with support from elements of the rank and file. Clever politicking, 
however, allowed the politicos to survive, regroup and then isolate the dissenters (Moloney 
2002: 479). A split entailing the departure of key figures on the Army Executive did follow 
but it was not as major as it could have been 18 months previously. The RIRA quickly 
organised bomb attacks but this campaign faltered after the Omagh attack, causing it to 
declare a temporary ceasefire before later re-launching its campaign with a new leadership 
(Frampton 2011). In the intervening years before the formal end of the Provisional campaign 
in 2005, the Provisionals were forced to adroitly advance their political strategy without 
aggrieving war-hardened sceptical volunteers who could potentially defect to existing splinter 
groups (Sanders 2011: 230). Post-2005 a number of new VDR groups have emerged, 
including localised offshoots of the CIRA and RIRA (Horgan 2013). These groups have 
benefited from the lack of the Provisional control mechanism to curtail their initial growth. 
However this is offset by the fact that they were born into a climate of increased 
normalisation and lack of societal appetite for a return to conflict. While none of the VDR 
groups – newer or older - are comparable in size or output to the Provisionals, they have 
nonetheless survived to continue the ‘armed struggle’. VDR groups exhibit an ‘operational 
diversity’ yet they also possess a certain ‘ideological homogeny’ in their shared rejection of 
the Sinn Fein strategy (Frampton 2011: 280). As such, the lines of separation between VDR 
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groups can sometimes blur allowing for military co-operation in a tactical broad front 
approach (Sanders 2011: 254). 
Notwithstanding all of this, the fact that competing groups have a “shared past” (Bean 2012), 
means those embracing constitutional politics have, by necessity, had to thread a fine line that 
legitimises their own past use of violence but delegitimises that of their militant opponents 
(Whiting 2012). This has seen attempts to monopolise the legacy of previous ‘armed 
struggle’ so as to conveniently differentiate between past and current violence, something 
naturally challenged by militants who portray their violence as the continuity of generations 
of ‘armed struggle’. What follows is a thematic dissection of how competing discourses 
within contemporary Irish republicanism on the utility, nature and motivations behind VDR 
have drawn from pre-existing scripts fashioned during previous splits. 
Pragmatism and purity 
The most common disjuncture among Irish republicans in the face of splitting is the choice 
between being pragmatic and being pure. Division hinges on either looking beyond 
ideological “taken for granteds” to become progressive or seeking comfort in established 
certainties for fear of ideological bankruptcy – in short tactics or principles. 
Pragmatism 
For those formerly engaged in ‘armed struggle’ there are “obvious contradictions and 
dissonances” that arise from extolling “the exemplary violence of the past while condemning 
the violence of the present” (Frenett and Smith 2012). ‘Armed struggle’ per se is not deemed 
illegitimate although current ‘armed struggle’ is. For example in its July 2005 statement 
announcing the end of its campaign the IRA “reiterate(d) our view that the armed struggle 
was entirely legitimate”.2 Likewise when Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams asked the IRA to consider 
its future he said: 
In the past I have defended the right of the IRA to engage in armed struggle. I 
did so because there was no alternative for those who would not bend the 
knee, or turn a blind eye to oppression, or for those who wanted a national 
republic. Now there is an alternative (quoted in An Phoblacht 2005b). 
Instructive in both examples is the use of the past tense “was” – ‘armed struggle’ was 
legitimate not is legitimate. If Adams’ remarks are taken as a cue, it seems a way of 
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circumnavigating contradiction is to make the legitimacy of ‘armed struggle’ contingent on 
there being “no alternative”. When an alternative emerges ‘armed struggle’ is no longer 
legitimate. One former combatant elaborated: 
You can’t say ‘I fought an armed struggle for the sake of armed struggle’. 
That’s nonsense. You fight an armed struggle because there is no other 
alternative and when there was no other alternative we fought an armed 
struggle. When the conditions presented themselves, when there was a 
realignment of the universe and Margaret Thatcher and John Major were no 
longer in power and Bush had gone and we had South Africa to look at you 
know there was - it just seemed at that moment - a possibility of another 
avenue. I was never handcuffed to an armed struggle so it was a tactic. It was 
the only tactic available to us but once there was an alternative we were dutily 
and morally bound to explore that (Interviewee 8). 
Seemingly then ‘armed struggle’ represents a tactic not a principle, meaning it can be 
discarded when political circumstances are favourable to a non-violent alternative. For those 
subscribing to such a view the matter hinges on favouring pragmatism over purity. This 
involves progressing beyond being a “rebel” that clings to ‘armed struggle’ because of a 
historic precedent to become a “revolutionary” engaged in transformative politics 
(Interviewee 3). Ultimately, so the logic flows, it will be the “revolutionary” and not the 
“rebel” who secures the goal of self-determination through political innovation rather than 
‘armed struggle’.  
In consequence to this, Sinn Fein discourse on VDR has been built on the twin planks of 
dismissing VDR as ineffective while promoting their own political strategy as a road map to 
self-determination. This has been sustained by a burgeoning political mandate in addition to 
concessions gleaned through various political negotiations (Horgan 2013: 168). The 
intertwining of these is evident in Michelle Gildernew’s condemnation of a 2008 bomb attack 
in Fermanagh: 
Those who carried out this attack have nothing to offer. They have little 
support and their actions will not advance Irish Unity one bit. Sinn Féin have a 
strategy for Irish unity and we will not be deflected by these activities (quoted 
in An Phoblacht 2008b). 
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Discernible in this discourse is an increasingly consequentialist view of ‘armed struggle’. 
Consequentialism evaluates the righteousness of violence through a calculation that the act 
will produce the most favourable outcome in terms of meeting an identifiable end goal 
(O’Boyle 2011). In the face of what has been termed the “mutually hurting stalemate” 
(O’Kane 2006), ‘armed struggle’ is not legitimate because it cannot advance towards 
ideological goals whereas a non-violent alternative of transformative politics can. VDR is 
therefore differentiated from past ‘armed struggle’ because it represents ‘armed struggle’ for 
the mere sake of it. Denying any sense of revolutionary or strategic agency to VDR has been 
central to this critical discourse. Brian Keenan dismissed it for having “no revolutionary 
logic” (An Phoblacht 2008a) while another former combatant opined that “there’s no 
strategy, no reason, no justification for it” (Interviewee 1). VDR is thus devoid of pragmatism 
and borne from the delusion of purity and the penchant for clinging to the old way, leading 
one former combatant to articulate: 
Because they don’t have an overall strategic objective or there is no dynamic 
about what they are about it’s basically about killing or attempting to kill for 
the sake of it because it cannot achieve any political objective. If you cannot 
achieve a political objective by doing it well then it’s wrong. It’s wrong 
morally, it’s wrong politically and it shouldn’t be happening. That’s the way I 
see it and one of the problems is that there is still this sense amongst some of 
them that they can achieve some sort of military objective by what they’re 
doing and they fail to understand the dynamic of struggle. They just don’t get 
it like as far as I am concerned. And they simply say to people like me ‘well it 
was okay for you to do it’ (Interviewee 5). 
Even critics of Sinn Fein agree to some extent with such criticism: 
Killing a cop here and there and a Brit every 10 years isn’t going to get the 
British out of here. I think that it has been shown even in the early 70’s- 1972 
over 100 British soldiers killed on the ground. They were expecting 100 
casualties from Operation Motorman alone and that didn’t get them out. They 
were willing to take that so killing two Brits every 10 years is not going to 
shift British policy… the militant republicans at the moment they seem to have 
one aim which is seemingly just to embarrass Sinn Fein… I think they know 
it’s not going to get the Brits out that it’s just making life awkward for the 
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Provies and their hatred of Sinn Fein I think is the only thing that gels them 
and keeps them going (Interviewee 11). 
Running in tandem with a discourse of VDR being benighted to the realpolitik of ‘armed 
struggle’ is a discourse on the continuation of struggle whereby the ‘armed struggle’ waged 
by the IRA in the past has been transformed into a political struggle being waged by Sinn 
Fein. Despite settling for less than the ‘armed struggle’ was fought for (self-determination for 
a united Ireland), the fact that the Provisionals have not had the “political lobotomy” that the 
Officials did means that the retention of the key aim of self-determination enables a discourse 
of struggle by other means to take root (Rekawek 2011: 101). Epitomising this transformation 
one interviewee concluded: 
Whenever we were active in the struggle we were political activists with guns 
and bombs and with weapons. I see myself today as a political activist without 
a gun and a bomb because we have moved beyond that (Interviewee 5). 
Although discourses of pragmatism over purity support the current position of Sinn Fein they 
are not new. During internal debate that preceded the Civil War, acceptance of the treaty was 
also framed in terms of pragmatism over purity and notions of adopting a stagist theory of 
working towards self-determination by other means (English 2006). These again featured in 
the discourse of the Officials during the 1969/70 split (Hanley and Millar 2009). 
Accordingly, Sinn Fein have mapped their own position on VDR onto a narrative template 
fashioned by those who previously discarded ‘armed struggle’ for constitutional politics. This 
narrative template of pragmatism over purity is incredibly useful for those entering the 
constitutional process. In premising entry into the constitutional process on the logic of 
pragmatically going through stages building towards the core ideological goal of national 
self-determination there is an ability to frame this process as something other than an 
admission of failure to achieve it via ‘armed struggle’. Projecting the attainment of the core 
goal as a long term aim to be gradually worked towards protects those entering the 
constitutional process from foreseeable criticism over failure to deliver sufficient progress 
towards that end in the immediate “here and now”.  This is particularly relevant in the current 
case of Sinn Fein where it must not only defend its stagist strategy but do so against an 
historic backdrop of persistent failure by other groups who previously adopted this approach. 
Despite persevering with the stagist approach for almost 20 years they are, in a tangible sense 
at least, no demonstrably closer to self-determination than when they signed up to the GFA. 
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If anything they stand accused of settling for the implementation of an equality agenda in the 
North of Ireland at the expense of national self-determination (Tonge 2004). The narrative 
template of pragmatism thus allows Sinn Fein to frame its current position not in terms of 
ideological shortcoming in the immediate term but in the positive potential it has in the 
indefinite long term.   
Purity 
What the Sinn Fein discourse overlooks is that for some purity trumps pragmatism meaning 
that adhering to traditional principles is more important than being more successful through 
unprincipled means (Horgan 2013: 26). ‘Armed struggle’ represents a principle until self-
determination has been obtained and cannot be downgraded to a tactic otherwise. In pursuit 
of this goal violence has purity while compromise has corruption (Kedourie 2003). If the 
Provisionals adopt a consequentialist interpretation, those supportive of VDR take a non-
consequentialist view where political violence is legitimate if it adheres to a moral code 
(O’Boyle 2011). This moral code ordains that until self-determination is granted ‘armed 
struggle’ remains legitimate regardless of any peace agreements that birth stagist theories. 
The GFA ,as Whiting (2015:1) notes, failed to herald a “defining moment” where militant 
Irish republicanism ceased to  be, while Sluka (2009) notes that continued failure to confront 
the core issue of conflict in the “not-war-not-peace” context of post-GFA Northern Ireland 
has left it conducive to residual political violence. In this context VDR represents “outside 
spoiler” violence designed to spoil any internal settlement on the basis of principled 
opposition to it (Zahar 2008).  Tonge (2012) has noted that  when militant republicans have 
been marginalised and made politically irrelevant by larger sections entering politics the trend 
is one of “seeking refuge in historical dogma” via an “inevitability of struggle” thesis. This 
suggests that justification for VDR is constructed through what Gurr (2011: 170) identified as 
a “violence-expectancy-justification-violence” nexus whereby failure to address underlying 
issues coupled with experiences of past violence creates an expectation of and historic 
justification for current and future violence. Read from a protracted script of generations of 
‘armed struggle’ it seems that until self-determination is granted there will always be ‘armed 
struggle’ and this will always be legitimate: 
While the British occupation remains there will always be those who are 
willing to resist it. At different times that may take different forms and it may 
be on a large scale or a small scale but I think that there has hardly been a year 
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in the history of the British occupation in Ireland that there hasn’t been some 
form of resistance and I don’t think that that’s going to change (Interviewee 
16). 
Much like discourses on pragmatism, this discourse of inevitability in the face of failing to 
address the core issue of conflict is not new. It mirrors the Provisional’s’ previous 
justification of their campaign. For example in rejecting the Sunningdale Agreement the 
Provisionals argued that ‘armed struggle’ was inevitable as long as occupation remained 
because “British rule and peace in Ireland are incompatible” (Republican News 1974).  
Likewise they derided the stagist approach of the Officials for suggesting that “the six-county 
state could be ‘democratised’ from within and that the so-called democratic process was one 
method by which this reformation could be made” (An Phoblacht 1981). The notion of a 
cyclic history replaying itself pervades a justificatory discourse on VDR as evidenced by the 
argument that: 
Irish history is a cycle of armed resistance, followed by coercion and attempts 
constitutionally to square the circle of British rule and Irish democracy. It is a 
circle which can never be squared because British rule denies the exercise of 
true all-Ireland democracy, namely the right of the people of Ireland acting as 
a unit to self-determination. The only way to break the cycle of history is to 
end British rule in Ireland once and for all (Saoirse 2009b). 
Unsurprisingly, then, Tonge (2014b: 59) concludes: 
History becomes cyclical, as spoiler groups become part of the mainstream 
and in turn are outflanked by later spoilers… spoilers are part of a historical 
process which demotes tactics in favour of principle, eschews compromise and 
relies upon supposed lessons of history to reject all compromise. 
Although these competing discourses draw on the past they are geared towards legitimating 
current positions. These positions correspond to two competing moral frameworks – purity 
and pragmatism – that define internal politicking that follows Irish republican splitting. To 
correlate with these moral frameworks by giving succour to present self-images selective 
‘remembering’ and ‘forgetting’ is adopted. Demonstrating the link between the “narrated 
self” and the “narrating self” (Antze and Lambek 1996), the latter day “revolutionaries” with 
their new political foresight ‘forget’ how the criticisms they make today were once levelled at 
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them and that the arguments used by their opponents mirror Provisional justifications for 
‘armed struggle’ in the past. The pragmatic “narrating self” of today ‘remembers’ with the 
benefit of politically informed hindsight that the pure “narrated self” of yesterday did not 
have. Adopting the process of “structural amnesia” that sees whole swathes of the past 
excised (Tota 2001), they ‘forget’ anything that does not adhere to a narrative of continuing 
‘armed struggle’ through pragmatic political struggle. Similarly VDR advocates ‘remember’ 
the past ideological justification for ‘armed struggle’ but ‘forget’ the markedly different 
political context existent then. An insular worldview has cocooned their discourse from 
changed external political realities. Purified justification of VDR because ‘armed struggle’ 
has always been engaged overlooks external factors like the ending of the Cold War, the 
destruction of the South African apartheid state and the ‘War on Terror’ and how these have 
created a context completely different to that of past ‘armed struggle’.  
The ‘micro group’ 
If VDR is differentiated from past ‘armed struggle’ because it lacks revolutionary nous it is 
differentiated too because it lacks similar intensity and scale. A critical discourse attributes 
this to the size of VDR groups and their apparent lack of support. That the scale of VDR is 
not in the same league as the intensity of the Provisional campaign is unquestionable. There 
has, however, been an increase in the scale and success of attacks in the current ‘third wave’ 
of VDR when compared to the lull of the ‘second wave’ that followed the disastrous ‘first 
wave’ forever associated with civilian deaths at Omagh (Horgan 2013: 71). Omagh invoked a 
“backlash” whereby a haemorrhaging of communal support follows unacceptable conduct 
(Horgan 2009: 23) - something also noted by Burton (1978) and Sluka (1989) in their 
analyses of the Provisionals’ relationship with the wider Nationalist community. That this 
happened so early in the VDR lifespan curtailed its potential to develop a protracted 
campaign.  
Scale 
Notwithstanding that VDR still poses some threat, Tonge (2014a) calculates that it has only 
reached 12% of the 1980’s rate and 30% of the 1990’s rate. In assessing VDR former 
combatants naturally draw parallels with the Provisional campaign before dismissing it as 
incomparable: 
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After years of armed conflict we fought the British government and the British 
Army to a standstill. They haven’t fought them to a start and most of their 
activities have hit at our own community harder than they have ever attacked 
the British establishment (Interviewee 8). 
Disadvantageous comparisons like this enable VDR to be naturally decoupled from the 
Provisional campaign yet they also elide fundamental truths about VDR. In setting the 
halcyon days of the Provisional campaign as the barometer by which VDR should be 
measured, those critical of it have consciously set a standard it cannot in the immediate term 
reach. The intensity of the Provisional campaign was a product of its time, owing itself to a 
combination of factors including plentiful recruits, the outworkings of repression-
mobilisation theory, initial lack of “war weariness” and the omnipresence of scope for and 
targets of attacks. To deliberately overlook these contextual discrepancies is an adroit piece 
of selective ‘remembering’ that imposes the temporal limits of ‘memory politics’ to 1969 as 
this is favourable to the anti-VDR position. The memory of episodic pre-1969 ‘armed 
struggle’ is essentially ‘forgotten’ even though it represents a more apposite comparison to 
measure VDR against – it too was far from intense, successful or popularly supported. This 
was alluded to by one veteran who was critical of VDR but recognised that it mirrored pre-
1969 ‘armed struggle’: 
I’m not saying there’s support for violence now. There wasn’t support for 
violence in the ‘60’s. We might have blew up Nelsons Pillar and a few other 
things like you know burnt post offices and stuff like that. I think that was 
more that ‘you know we’re still here’ (Interviewee 12). 
As well as contextualising VDR in a wider historic context this observation provides a more 
nuanced insight into what sustains it. VDR seems in part to be motivated by a need to prove 
that a radical Irish republicanism exists today. Propagandistically self-referential it may be 
but it does solve an existential crisis.  Comparable to showing that the IRA were “still here” 
in the 1960’s, VDR can too be seen as “strategic violence” in that although ultimately aiming 
to change the power balance of internal affairs, in terms of immediacy in a post-conflict state 
its value is merely “signalling a willingness to fight” (Boyle 2014: 30).  In this regard then, 
just like residual IRA activity in previous eras, while VDR may not represent a threat to the 
state comparable to that posed by the Provisionals it nonetheless challenges what Gurr (2011: 
186) calls the “regime legitimacy” of post-GFA Northern Ireland through non-compliance 
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and spoiler violence. A nuanced interpretive difference between seeing VDR as “strategic 
violence” as opposed to seeing it only as “spoiler violence” exists. As “strategic violence” 
VDR assumes an uneasy degree of usefulness that VDR as mere “spoiler violence” cannot. 
Instead of being negative in the sense of seeking to spoil the political process, it can, albeit 
somewhat paradoxically, be seen to underline why the political process must succeed. 
Essentially VDR activity, even if against its express intentions, actuates on a restricted scale 
the “dooms day” scenario awaiting collapse of the political process. The residual levels of 
political violence manifested through the phenomenon are a (so far) contained yet constant 
reminder of the alternative to a successful peace process. VDR groups - whatever their 
numerical state or exact organisational allegiance - will step into the breach if need be to take 
up the cudgels full time just as the Provisionals did after bygone leaner days. 
When evaluated in this wider context of spoiler violence, the rationale for VDR is grounded 
less in inflicting mounting causalities on the security forces and more in disrupting any 
semblance of normalisation in the post-GFA state. It is about “engaging normalisation head 
on” because “there cannot be a peace process without peace” (The Sovereign Nation 2010b). 
The Real IRA openly acknowledged their intention to “reject the ongoing process of 
pacification and normalisation” (The Sovereign Nation 2007). What criticism about the 
intensity of VDR neglects to recognise is that its immediate aim of disrupting normalisation 
can be achieved without mounting a campaign matching that of the Provisionals. This reflects 
Guelke’s (2006:97) considered observation that spoilers face only the limited task of 
generating a certain level of disruption or negativity commensurable to temporarily upsetting 
the political process. This point was illustrated in a Belfast Telegraph (Young 2015) article 
on a picture of two masked gunmen in Lurgan that had been promoted on social media: 
Over 20 years after the paramilitary ceasefires, two masked gunmen strut and 
preen on the streets of a Northern Ireland housing estate, waving their 
weapons around with impunity… this is the savage reality of Lurgan’s 
Kilwilkie estate in 2015. 
This activity is performative rather than perfunctory; it serves to reinforce a historical 
narrative but it does not have any actual military benefit. Its value lies in the symbolism 
rather than substance of the act. It serves to disrupt normalisation through “propaganda by 
deed” (Dingley 2001). No enemy fatalities recorded, no casualties claimed, not even a shot 
fired - the mere sight of armed republicans was sufficient to communicate the VDR message. 
16 
 
16 
 
Thus even a highly performative, bloodless act of violence endows VDR groups with a 
“political voice” capable of “drowning out quieter and calmer voices and changing the debate 
over who speaks, by what right and for whom” (Prince and Warner 2013). This “political 
voice” echoes that heard in the past without any innovation or departure, reinforcing the 
narrative template that ‘armed struggle’ will continue regardless of flawed internal 
settlements. VDR becomes an integral component of Thornton’s (1964: 82) “advertising” 
process that uses political violence as a means of bringing attention to a groups existence and 
goals. According to its proponents VDR dispels the notion that militant republicanism is 
“politically irrelevant” today by “bringing back the issue of British occupation and placing it 
at the top of the political agenda” (The Sovereign Nation 2010a).  
However, the long term viability of relying on infrequent performative acts to disrupt 
normalisation is debateable. Short term strategic payoff is unlikely to be sustained on an 
indefinite basis. With the memory of pre-1994 conflict becoming more distant, the nascent 
‘normalisation’ process - in tandem with the burgeoning political process - has already begun 
embedding (to the degree that the North of Ireland can ever be considered ‘normal’). As this 
concretises, the VDR campaign must respond by increasing its intensity, relevance and 
visibility to successfully prevent society from increasingly functioning around a severe 
official threat level. 
The notion of “passing on the torch” to the next generation is evident in how the names 
adopted by VDR groups mirror those used in the past – normally with some revised prefix to 
the ‘IRA’ trademark but also continued use of the Oglaigh na hEireann (Irish for ‘warriors or 
soldiers of Ireland’) nom de guerre. The IRA name in itself engenders a sense of legitimacy, 
thus as Rekawek (2011: 1) notes it is a “brand name” worth contesting. For those partaking in 
VDR a sense of continuity bound up in the name legitimises their campaign. Those opposed 
to VDR have unsurprisingly sought to challenge this by denying that VDR groups are 
descendants of previous ‘armed struggle’. To this end Gerry Adams bluntly argued that VDR 
groups “are not the IRA” (An Phoblacht 2011). Adams’ comments found a willing audience 
in former combatants who ground differentiation between current and past ‘armed struggle’ 
in the fact that the IRA “as an organisation” moved to support the Sinn Fein strategy 
(Interviewee 7). Accordingly ownership rights of the IRA legacy are determined by weight of 
numbers - a calculation benefiting Sinn Fein: 
17 
 
17 
 
All that I can say is that the vast majority of the guys who were active at the 
period, who remained active right the way through, right up until the IRA 
declared the ceasefires that they have stayed on the path and have stayed true 
to the republican leadership. One of the things that is very hard to take is 
people who were active for a while during that period who... walked away 
from the conflict have now become some sort of superheroes or are attempting 
to portray themselves as more republican than any of the rest of us 
(Interviewee 5). 
If a weight of numbers argument ordains Sinn Fein the inheritors of the Provisional’s ‘armed 
struggle’ due to a corporate transfer of ‘armed struggle’ into political struggle then VDR 
groups can be relegated to numerical insignificance. From their inception VDR groups have 
been portrayed by the Provisionals as minute factions. In the aftermath of the split that 
birthed the Real IRA the Provisionals dismissed defections as “a small number of 
resignations” before asserting “the IRA as an organisation remains intact” (An Phoblacht 
1997). This has become more central to the Sinn Fein discourse on VDR groups with their 
preferred term now being ‘micro groups’ (An Phoblacht 2005a). “Structural amnesia” masks 
the irony that the Provisionals were a fledgling breakaway faction at one point too. This was 
‘remembered’ by other observers. One noted that the Provisionals were “still very much a 
splinter group” when they opposed Sunningdale (Interviewee 12) while another commented 
that listening to talk of ‘micro groups’ was “like rewinding back to 1970-71” (Interviewee 
13). Accordingly then this narrative template on ‘micro-groups’ fashioned during the 1969/70 
split persists today even if those cast as the ‘micro group’ has changed. In any event the 
charge of being small and conspiratorial is not perceived as a slight by the ‘micro group’ but 
rather seen as an affirmation of their ideological purity and steadfastness (Whiting 2015). 
Support 
A similar dynamic underpins narratives that VDR has no support, which are problematic for 
their simplistic approach to the matter - measuring support for political violence is more 
complex than trying to gauge open support for militant groups (Burton 1978; Sluka 1989). 
Admittedly VDR does not ostensibly have the considerable support - electoral or otherwise - 
that the Provisionals had but sympathy for it is higher than the Sinn Fein discourse suggests 
(Evans and Tonge 2012). In any event VDR groups regard themselves as the faithful few and 
have little heed in securing majoritarian support for ‘the Republic’. Their mandate comes 
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from the patriot dead and history not illegitimate parliaments or partitionist votes. A cynic 
might opine that this discourse is contrived avoidance of confronting the reality that the 
appetite for political violence has significantly lessened among a war weary community 
willing to accept an imperfect “not-war-not-peace” over renewed violence. Legitimacy today, 
as in the past, stems from historic truth and not popular support: 
The use of arms prior to 1916 was legitimate. The use of arms in Easter 1916 
was legitimate. The use of arms after 1916 was totally legitimate. In the 
existing political context of partition, illegal occupation and the denial of 
national self-determination, armed struggle, in 2015, remains a legitimate act 
of resistance (Ardoyne republican Dee Fennell quoted in McDonald 2015). 
Invoking this purist narrative template accentuates the observed reality that ‘armed struggle’ 
has always been a minority pursuit. Even the 1916 rebels-turned-heroes were 
“unrepresentative of public political opinion” (English 2006: 262). The same applied to the 
‘Border Campaign’ (Hanley and Millar 2009) and, to a lesser degree, the Provisionals too 
(Tonge 2012). Former Provisionals nevertheless argue that, unlike VDR groups today, they 
had a “mandate” from their community even before Sinn Fein contested elections 
(Interviewee 8) and the backing of a “strong movement” sustained by communal support 
(Interviewee 2). Similar arguments were used by successive Dublin governments to 
differentiate between the campaign of the ‘old IRA’ (a term used to describe the pre-1969 
incarnation) and that of the Provisionals, the implication being that unlike the Provisionals, 
the ‘old IRA’ had a mandate from the Irish people and did not attack civilians - this was often 
repudiated by ‘old IRA’ veterans, sections of the Irish public and the Provisionals (Hanley 
2013). The Provisionals challenged this narrative by pointing out the similarities between 
‘old IRA’ attacks that killed civilians and its lack of contemporary support and those in the 
context of the Provisionals own campaign (Sinn Fein 1985). Discourses suggesting that VDR 
is different to ‘armed struggle’ of the past because it has no support among the Irish people 
are therefore reflective of a narrative template previously used by the Dublin government. 
‘Felon setting’ 
Despite an overarching discourse dismissing the ‘micro group’, the fact remains that the 
emergence of new groups creates competition for support within a limited constituency. 
Consequentially the parent group must protect their hegemony. Historically within Irish 
republicanism this has been done through questioning the motivation and war record of 
19 
 
19 
 
break-away groups (Hanley 2003). This does not necessarily deride the violent substance of 
the VDR act per se (after all it is substantively verisimilar to the shooting and bombing of 
past ‘armed struggle’) but those committing the act are unequivocally denounced. 
Undermining the credibility of those engaged in and promoting political violence is, after all, 
one of the easiest ways to dampen the appeal of such violence (Grossman 2014). This ‘felon 
setting’ process has birthed critical narratives dismissing the ‘micro group’ as an amalgam of 
‘truceleers’ who never fought the war, egoists driven by the cult of personality and a desire 
for ‘hard man’ status and gangsters using Irish republicanism as a front for wanton 
criminality.  
‘Truceleers’ 
Unsurprisingly Sinn Fein discourse on VDR has adapted itself to this narrative template by 
relying on the “war record” of its leadership to sanctify their current position (Frennett and 
Smith 2012). This has stemmed from the continued support of notable operatives – those 
Bowyer-Bell (1998) calls “sound” volunteers. This reinforces their continuation of struggle 
narrative through personifying the “rebel” to “revolutionary” evolution but also further 
dismisses VDR groups by inferring that they cannot claim the IRA mantle as they never 
actually fought the ‘war’. The most blatant manifestation of this was when Martin 
McGuinness stated that as a former IRA commander he could authoritatively say VDR 
groups had “no right” to restart ‘armed struggle’ (quoted in Friel 2009). Former combatants 
at grassroots level have adopted this discourse to dismiss their VDR critics as latter day 
republicans with no demonstrable war record. One former combatant showed indifference to 
VDR critics because “I never seen them 20 years ago” (Interviewee 2). A more scathing 
synopsis inferred that: 
As for the individuals who castigate and who point fingers. I know some of 
them... they are of the age that when the war was on they could have got 
involved in the war. They chose not to. They chose to go and live a life and 
have jobs or have a social life that existed from Monday to Monday and now 
they see themselves as some saviour of or the representative of the republican 
movement (Interviewee 6). 
In asserting that VDR groups never fought the ‘war’, former combatants neatly differentiate 
between their past ‘armed struggle’ and current VDR and, just like with the weight of 
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numbers argument and denying any revolutionary agency to VDR , attempt to silo off the 
IRA legacy to legitimise their current position.  
That these arguments have been used in the past was not lost on others: 
Another one that I hear coming up again and again is this idea – and I think 
Martin McGuinness touched on it recently… in a speech at the Provisional 
Sinn Fein Ard Fheis he made reference to people over a certain age who he 
hadn’t seen during the ‘war’ and others who were far too young, this ‘post-
conflict’ generation as they are described. Again this stuff is as old as the hills. 
That similar kind of pejorative language was used during the Civil War for 
example when the pro-treaty side referred to a lot of the young generation who 
had joined as ‘truceleers’, that these were young people who hadn’t been out 
in the Tan War, they didn’t really know what they were fighting for and were 
dismissed and you know that was seen to be a fallacy (Interviewee 15).  
The Provisionals themselves were previously on the receiving end of such derisory dismissal 
from the Officials (The Plough 1973). Current criticism of VDR on this basis therefore 
adheres to a longstanding narrative template used to delegitimise breakaway groups and 
protect the hegemony of the increasingly constitutionalist parent group. 
Likewise the narrative of young impressionable people being exploited by the “men of 
violence” echoes previous criticism made of the Provisionals (Kelly 1986) – particularly that 
from the clergy (Sluka 1989). Criticism that VDR groups are “happy to risk the lives and 
liberty of young, impressionable people to achieve nothing” (Gerry Kelly quoted in Hedges 
2012) and that the “wee young ones… sucked into all this auld talk” will “end up in jail” 
instead of the “men of violence” (Interviewee 7) again reflects previous discourses. Moreover 
this regurgitated criticism overlooks how the membership of VDR groups is “diverse and 
heterogeneous” and includes “former Provisional IRA members… others [who] were 
teenagers or young adults during the peace process… others … [who] are not old enough to 
remember the 1994 ceasefires” (Horgan 2013: 135). This latter observation fundamentally 
challenges the narrative that VDR groups never fought the ‘war’ - particularly given more 
recent defections by senior former Provisionals - and that they are young people exploited by 
older “men of violence”. Notwithstanding this, those engaged in VDR have been depicted as 
the “enemy other” in mainstream discourse that depoliticises their actions and motives by 
reducing them to the status of “evil” people stuck in the “bad old days” (Whiting 2012). 
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Egoists 
The ideological basis underpinning VDR has also been questioned. Given that the modus 
operandi of ‘armed struggle’ has seen little substantive change there is an imperative to not 
find fault with the substance of an act one once perpetrated but to instead find fault with the 
current motivation for such an act. Shifting the critique from an unchanged modus operandi 
to a supposedly much changed raision d’être provides a buffer from natural charges of blatant 
hypocrisy – i.e. the “it was okay for you to do it” argument alluded to by Interviewee 5 
earlier. This vein of criticism is less about the what of VDR and more about the who and the 
why. VDR has been portrayed as personality driven, with the Provisionals noting that the 
earliest defections involved “a very small number of people” that were “closely associated 
with each other” (An Phoblacht 1997). While there is doubtless veracity in observations 
about the link between defection and personality and localised loyalty, this ‘forgets’ how 
these factored in previous splits with the Officials (Hanley and Millar 2009) and after the 
Treaty (Rice 2015). The importance of localised loyalty is particularly evident in relation to 
more marginal groups like the INLA and IPLO, with their presence and influence 
concentrated in certain districts like Divis in West Belfast (Sluka 1989; Sluka 2012: 284). 
More politically calculated are the claims that VDR is driven by ego and status chasing rather 
than ideology. This argument speaks more fundamentally to the nature of involvement in 
political violence and spoiler violence. Existing academic research demonstrates that there 
are a multitude of motivations behind and pathways into political violence (Della Porta 1995; 
Shirlow, Tonge McAuley and McGlynn 2010; Bosi 2012). VDR is hardly an exception to this 
but neither were the Provisionals, the Officials or the ‘old IRA’. Similar observations apply to 
spoiler violence. Spoiler violence, be it VDR, post-Oslo accord Hamas violence (Tonge 
2014b: 74) or that of Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) splinter groups (Boyle 2014: 178) can 
of course be ideologically driven. In Kosovo, however, spoiler violence was also driven by 
power, prestige, status and financial gain (Boyle 2014: 179). Similar conclusions have been 
drawn about the link between vested interests and spoiler violence in South Africa (Sisk 
1993; Guelke 2006). More general observations reveal that a sense of ego and status retention 
lies behind spoiler violence when those who held a certain position of power or influence 
during conflict do not wish to engage in conflict settlement if it involves losing this status 
(Steadman 2008: 158). As a form of spoiler violence VDR is unlikely to be the exception to 
overlap between these mixed motivations.  
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Sinn Fein have, however, inflated status related motivation and excised any ideological 
motivation by cultivating a discourse that VDR is “more to do with egos and personal 
fiefdoms than anything else” (Gerry Kelly quoted in Hedges 2012). This pervaded the 
assessment of one former combatant who articulated: 
The way I see people who are still involved in that. Some of them it’s because 
of ego, because once the war is over once they do not have the persona of you 
know the local commander and they don’t have access to weapons... they’ve 
lost this status and they find it very, very hard to deal with (Interviewee 5).  
Another argued that those behind VDR were only trying to position themselves as “some 
kind of hard man” within the community for status and self-gain (Interviewee 6). As Feldman 
(1991: 47) notes, the violence of the ‘hard man’, depoliticised and predicated on status and 
recognition, is different to the ideologised violence of the ‘gunman’ that is worthy of 
community support. Ideologised violence may be brutal but it is for a noble ends. The 
violence of the ‘hard man’, on the other hand, is simply deviant and gratuitous – worse, 
perhaps, than misguided ‘armed struggle’ for the mere sake of ‘armed struggle’. 
Gangsters 
Criticism of the ‘hard man’ reflects Steenkemp’s (2005) argument that if denuded of political 
motivation spoiler violence becomes thuggish and/or criminal. To this end those engaged in 
VDR were labelled “criminals and rogues” (Interviewee 4) and “very dodgy, suspect 
characters” (Interviewee 6), and VDR groups lambasted as “flags of convenience for 
criminality” (An Phoblacht 2010). Divesting continued ‘armed struggle’ by ‘former 
comrades’ of political connotations adapts the thrust of state criminalisation policies to 
internal ‘memory politics’ for the hegemonic purpose of separating current ‘armed struggle’ 
from the exemplary ‘armed struggle’ of the past. Nothing is less revolutionary, after all, than 
common criminality. Given that Irish republicans have been prepared to die rather than 
accept the slur of criminality, there can be no greater affront to those engaged in ‘armed 
struggle’ than to have their endeavours wilfully dismissed as mere criminality – particularly 
if so dismissed by erstwhile ‘former comrades’. This ‘felon setting’ tactic has a notable 
history in internal Irish republican politicking. The Officials, for example, argued that the 
Provisional’s membership “contains a large criminal element whose self-interests takes 
precedence over all other considerations” (The United Irishman 1972). The Provisionals 
countered by condemning the Officials as a “criminal gang” involved in “gangsterism” 
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(Hanley and Millar 2010: 317). A ‘felon setting’ narrative template criminalising rivals 
therefore exists within the constituency. Admittedly such discourses were evident during the 
conflict too when competing groups vied for hegemony among a limited support base and 
constituency. Having managed to largely attain such hegemony by the late 1980’s, the 
Provisionals were able to reject any suggestion that competing groups represented the Irish 
republican constituency (Wright 1991). A scathing discourse dismissing, initially, the INLA 
(Sluka 1989) and then the IPLO (Sluka 2012: 285) as a rag-tag band of psychopathic, 
criminal misfits took root. Post-conflict, however, there has been a more notable and 
concerted adoption of what Grossman (2014) has termed “the grammar of terrorism” that was 
formerly used by the state to delegitimize Provisional violence but is now used by such 
quarters to politically attack VDR groups. This revised internal ‘memory politics’ “grammar 
of terrorism” sees VDR groups labelled ignorant truceleers oblivious to the harsh realities of 
‘armed struggle’ and egotistical criminals intent on using the guise of ideologised violence 
for their own nefarious ends. The latter is extremely useful in maligning VDR groups because 
it cuts against the grain of the conventional maxim that Irish republicanism offers only a life 
of hardship and sacrifice rather than one of unbridled glory and personal enrichment. 
The ‘near enemy’ 
Sinn Fein discourse, however, extends beyond criminalising and depoliticising ‘former 
comrades’ to depict them as enemy agents. Discrediting break-away groups like this is a 
natural way for the parent group to bolster their hegemony. Break-away factions are thus 
portrayed as the antithesis of a noble ideology rather than the purest epitome of it. The 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealaim (LTTE), for example, argued that Karuna’s break-away 
faction were in a league with the Sri Lankans (Hoglund 2005).  VDR is similarly about 
working to “sabotage the republican movement” (An Phoblacht 2010) by serving “MI5 
agendas” intent on “defeating republicanism” (Interviewee 6). This has a resonance with 
Official claims that the Provisionals were a Fianna Fail inspired creation designed to defeat 
radical republicanism (The United Irishman 1979). If the parent group moves to protect its 
hegemony in intra-communal politicking then the break-away faction must too justify its own 
existence. This is channelled through the alleged ideological corruption of the parent group 
who have opted for constitutional means over ‘armed struggle’. In announcing its arrival, the 
Irish Republican Socialist Movement, for example, charged the Officials with embracing 
“reformist and counter-revolutionary attitudes” (The Starry Plough 1975). This charge 
provoked the rebuke that the accusers were serving “the same purpose as the British Army” 
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(The United Irishman 1975). Similarly the IPLO justified its emergence on the basis of 
“need” not “desire”, attributing their existence to the “degeneration” of the INLA and the 
lack of revolutionary socialism among the Provisionals (Socialist Republican 1988). This 
ideological corruption is then used to underpin a narrative on the absorption of ‘former 
comrades’ into the repressive state apparatus of the enemy. Current Sinn Fein ‘felon setting’ 
is therefore likened to that undertaken by ‘former comrades’ in previous eras. It is mapped 
onto a narrative template where pro-treaty forces used “British guns” on the Four Courts in 
the 1920’s and the infamous ‘Broy harriers’ repressed republicans at the behest of Fianna Fail 
in the 1930’s(Saoirse 2009a). In drawing out this argument one republican asserted: 
Over the last 90 years I think at this stage there has been we’ll say five/six 
major departures, major divisions within the republican movement… on each 
occasion those who took what we would regard as that reformist position 
despite their protestations at the beginning that this was simply another tactic, 
opening another front or whatever the particular jargon or language of the 
time… have ultimately been absorbed into the apparatus of the state to the 
point that for instance we’ll say Fianna Fail within 16 years were actually 
executing and interning republicans.  You know likewise particularly the 
Workers Party you know ultimately got to a point where they were actively 
opposing and speaking out against the hungerstrikes and so on. And the 
Provisionals I suppose are probably the more striking example because I think 
they’ve actually brought it to a level that none of their predecessors have 
(Interviewee 15). 
This unprecedented level refers to Martin McGuinness labelling those who killed two British 
sappers as “traitors” and instructing the republican community to support the subsequent 
police investigation into the attack (McKittrick 2009). On the one hand this signals, from a 
VDR perspective, irrevocable absorption into ‘the system’, but from the perspective of the 
Sinn Fein discourse asking people to ‘inform’ is the most emphatic manifestation of 
differentiating between VDR and past ‘armed struggle’. There is no clearer way of 
criminalising VDR and communicating that it embodies all that past ‘armed struggle’ did not 
by asking people to actively conspire against it.  
These competing discourses highlight the accuracy of Bowyer-Bell’s (1998: 241) argument 
that the “end game” of ‘armed struggle’ sees the enemy “redefined” so as to include ‘former 
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comrades’. ‘Former comrades’ become the “near enemy” (Gerges 2005), an internal and 
more immediate threat than ‘the Brits’ as “far enemy”. The “near enemy” has a long history 
in the internal politicking of Irish republican factionalisation whether as criminal counter-
revolutionary saboteurs of the revolutionary transformative political project or as treacherous 
collaborators assimilated into the system to conspire against ‘the Republic’. While the “near 
enemy” has been a constant feature of internal Irish republican politics, in keeping with the 
nature of narrative templates, the specificity of who it is has changed from Fine Gael to 
Fianna Fail to the Officials to the Provisionals to VDR groups.   
Conclusion 
This article identifies that common discursive mechanisms on the utility, character, scale, 
support for and motivation behind ‘armed struggle’ exist within the Irish republican 
constituency. Drawn from previous splits but adapted to current contexts, these enable those 
entering constitutional politics to protect their hegemonic position, monopolise the legacy of 
previous ‘armed struggle’ and delegitimize ‘former comrades’ intent on carrying on ‘armed 
struggle’. At its most base level this involves criminalising ‘former comrades’ and depicting 
them as enemy agents. These discursive tropes can also be highly complex and incorporate a 
wider examination of the utility of political violence in a changed ‘War on terror’ 
environment in the face of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’. At other times they hinge on the 
more simplistic machismo of arguments about who ‘fought the war’. Whether complex or 
simplistic, however, the intention remains differentiating between past ‘armed struggle’ and 
current ‘armed struggle’ in order to legitimise one’s current political position and to 
delegitimize that of ‘former comrades’. This provokes a response from those supportive of 
continued ‘armed struggle’. Relying in the first on ideological purity and the historic mandate 
passed on from previous generations, justification for ‘armed struggle’ is channelled through 
an ‘inevitability of struggle’ narrative template that depicts it as legitimate and indeed 
foreseeable until ‘the Republic’ has been attained. Drawing from the past, they argue that a 
cyclic history of ‘armed struggle’ is in their favour regardless of any internal political 
settlements, lack of support or ‘felon setting’ by ‘former comrades’ imbibed into ‘the 
system’. These competing narratives have seen ‘former comrades’ recast as the ‘near enemy’ 
threatening to peace, threatening to ‘the Republic’ and, whether through criminality, sabotage 
or unprecedented ideological dilution, threatening to Irish republicanism itself. If ‘armed 
struggle’ is thus inevitable as long as ‘the Republic’ eludes, then as long as Irish 
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republicanism continues to split the marginalisation of ‘former comrades’ through reversion 
to pre-existing scripts seems inevitable also. 
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